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4Introduction
May 2013 saw the reaching of an important milestone. 
On May 9, 2013 the daily mean concentration of 
carbon dioxide in the atmosphere measured at Mauna 
Loa, Hawaii, surpassed 400 parts per million (ppm) for 
the first time since measurements began in 1958. This 
figure was treated as an option for a desirable stabiliza-
tion level during initial climate change negotiations, but 
was later raised to the '450 ppm scenario', which is still 
compatible with the internationally agreed ambition of 
keeping the average global temperature increase below 
2 degrees centigrade. 
The rising concentration levels stem from still increasing 
emissions, and increasingly these emissions stem from 
economic growth in developing and transitional econo-
mies. The data supporting the Emissions Gap Report 
2012 (UNEP 2012) show that Annex I GHG emissions 
fell from 19.2 Gt in 1990 to 17.7 Gt in 2010, while 
non-Annex I GHG emissions grew from 16.6 Gt in 1990 
to 30.2 Gt in 2010. The common but differentiated 
responsibilities principle requires developed countries 
to take the lead in reducing emissions, but the problem 
of the growing emissions in developing countries from 
development intended to address socio-economic 
challenges, including the outsourcing of emissions from 
developed economies into the emissions accounts in 
less developed manufacturing bases, must be ad-
dressed if the 2 degree goal is to be met. 
The notion of 'Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Action' 
(NAMA), which first appeared at the 13th conference 
of the Parties to the UNFCCC in Bali, Indonesia, does 
precisely that. The Bali Action Plan (UNFCCC, 2007) 
launched a new process to enhance implementation 
of the Convention. It stated that, in order to “enhance 
national/international action on mitigation of climate 
change…” developing countries will take “nation-
ally appropriate mitigation actions … in the context 
of sustainable development, supported and enabled 
by technology, financing and capacity-building, in a 
measurable, reportable and verifiable manner...”. Since 
then the concept has evolved further. By 2010, dif-
ferentiation between internationally supported actions 
and unilateral actions stipulated that, in the context 
of their social and economic development priorities, 
'developing country Parties will take nationally appropri-
ate mitigation actions … aimed at achieving a deviation 
in emissions relative to “business as usual” emissions 
in 2020', emphasizing in the Cancun Agreements that 
'...in accordance with Article 4, paragraph 3, of the 
Convention, developed country Parties shall provide 
enhanced financial, technological and capacity build-
ing support for the preparation and implementation of 
nationally appropriate mitigation actions of developing 
country Parties' (UNFCCC, 2010). Further details of the 
background and legal basis for NAMAs can be found in 
UNEP Risø's 'Understanding the Concept of Nationally 
Appropriate Mitigation Action' (UNEP Risø 2013).
NAMAs are voluntary activities to mitigate greenhouse 
gas (GHG) emissions in developing countries that 
are not subject to mitigation commitments under the 
UNFCCC. The determination of actions captured under 
a NAMA is each country’s sovereign right, the defini-
tion of 'appropriate mitigation action' being relative to 
each Party's particular national circumstances' (UNDP/
UNFCCC/UNEP, 2013). Among these circumstances, 
national financial capacity also plays an important role. 
This Primer is devoted to the financing of NAMAs and 
presents essential principles and models of financing. 
It highlights challenges in the financing of the policies 
and programmes that make up the NAMAs, as well 
as possible ways to overcome these challenges. Most 
importantly, it does not concur with the notion that the 
best way to cover any extra costs of reducing emis-
sions is a grant. 
5There are many issues embedded in the financing of 
actions with lower emission profiles. One is the cost 
efficiency of emissions reductions, which was the 
main driver and motivation of the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM). Another is leveraging sufficient 
capital to meet the demand for funding. A third topic 
is the financial involvement of the private sector, which 
is thought to be crucial for the mobilization of the USD 
100 billion per year needed by 2020 to finance mitiga-
tion and adaptation actions in developing countries. 
The sources of finance are, of course, central, but even 
more central is the way in which they collaborate and 
cooperate – or ought to do so – in order to bring about 
the most efficient financing models. If bending the 
emissions trajectory is crucial, bending the rules that 
govern traditional development financing is one place 
to start. 
The Primer focuses on financing the NAMA, not 
financing its preparation. Technical assistance in this 
regard has been omitted, partly because it is already 
happening and rapidly increasing (with the UNEP 
DTU Partnership, formerly the UNEP Risø Centre, as 
one of the main players in implementation), and partly 
because there is not much financial engineering in the 
provision of a grant. Instead, the Primer focuses on the 
instruments available for public and private economic 
interaction. It therefore has an implicit focus on leverag-
ing, as this is currently the preferred term with which 
to illustrate this public-private interaction. Ultimately, 
however, it will be a matter of engineering the financing 
model as economically efficiently as possible within the 
confines of national priorities, realizing that, no matter 
how efficiently structured it is, financial engineering will 
not make the costs disappear. At best it may bolster 
the will to accommodate them.
The roles of different stakeholders are significantly 
influenced by the mode of implementation, which itself 
is directly linked to the financing model. Designing a 
NAMA as a theoretical exercise and only in the final 
phase considering whether there is any chance to 
attract the financing is ill-advised. The considerations 
of the financing model belong at the beginning of the 
NAMA design process, not at the end.
6Although widely used as a term, climate finance does 
not have any definition. Intuitively, it would be finance 
motivated by a concern for the changing climate, but 
current practice seems to include all financing going to-
wards low emission technology (and climate resilience), 
regardless of the motivation. Climate finance for mitiga-
tion purposes addresses a traditional externality, i.e. a 
normally negative and thus unwanted effect of another 
prime activity, in this case greenhouse gas emissions, 
whether from energy production, transportation or food 
production, to mention just the three prime sources of 
emissions.
The reduction of emissions is only rarely a separate 
purpose of investments, and climate finance there-
fore does not constitute a separate type of financing. 
Rather, it is an objective that countries and policy-mak-
ers take into consideration for national development 
alongside a number of other development parameters 
and priorities. In health and education, agriculture and 
industrial development, transportation and energy 
supply other primary concerns drive development, and 
emissions reduction only becomes an additional con-
sideration to the extent that it is ‘nationally appropriate’. 
Nationally appropriate mitigation action is establishing 
itself as a new motivation for investment. But as a mere 
concept it requires concrete policy proposals before it 
can serve as a real driver of investment. It is increas-
ingly expected that NAMAs must lead to 'transforma-
tional' changes. Although ‘transformational’ also lacks 
any official definition, it may nevertheless be helpful in 
establishing a definition of NAMA finance. A common 
interpretation of transformation is to change one state 
of affairs into another, such change not being tempo-
rary, but rather permanent. Such changes therefore 
relate to permanent operational activities rather than to 
fixed assets, i.e. it is not the asset alone, but its usage 
that is significant. It is therefore natural for NAMAs to 
be mostly thought of as policies and less as projects. 
In between there may be temporary programmes. If 
the permanent transformation relates to the operation 
rather than the asset, then it is also the case that the 
crucial financing relates to the operation and not to the 
asset investment, i.e. it is about the financing of the 
permanent operation of policy instruments. 
Policies implemented by governments in attaining na-
tional sustainable development objectives are common-
ly accompanied by government funding. Here, invest-
ment motivation exists at at least four levels: 1) the 
NAMA as a motivation factor for assessing the impact 
of existing policy on GHG emissions; 2) policy correc-
tion to address both national sustainable development 
goals and climate change, as well as to assess the 
financial implications of supporting the policy; 3) mo-
tivating the public sector to devote additional finance 
for a given policy; and 4) this particular policy's ability 
to motivate private or other public entities to invest. It 
must be emphasized at the outset, however, that (part 
of) such government funding may ultimately originate 
from international support, although this should not be 
the starting point. This point will be dealt with later.
Government motives
NAMAs are generally defined within the context of 
general development planning or, ideally, Low Emission 
Development Strategies.1 Many elements of general de-
velopment planning inherently include initiatives that in 
themselves have emissions reduction effects or whose 
implementation modalities may be shifted towards a 
lower level of emissions. Emissions reduction, therefore, 
will commonly be regarded a co-benefit related to other 
prime objectives like reducing traffic congestion, reduc-
ing health hazards in landfills, preventing hazardous 
emissions from old power plants, improving security of 
supply, providing energy access, substituting imports, 
reducing subsidies, pursuing targeted industrial devel-
opment and a host of other motivations. Emissions re-
duction integrated with such motivations may come at 
no cost – in which case host countries for such policies 
may refrain from labelling them 'NAMAs' or neglect to 
do so. It is, however, advisable to report such unilat-
eral actions from the simple reason that, when emis-
sions reduction options do come with extra costs and 
a NAMA host country wishes to attract international 
financing to overcome these costs, the national effort in 
other areas may be recognized by those financiers that 
may consider contributing. 
International support for NAMAs should essentially 
be additional to resources raised within the national 
borders (government allocations and private investment 
imposed through government regulation) as a result 
of the motivation to meet national sustainable devel-
1 See Low Carbon Development Strategies: A Primer on Framing Nationally 
Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs) in Developing Countries, UNEP 
Risø 2011.
Defining NAMA Finance
7Box 1: CDM investmentopment goals. Arriving at a figure for the shortfall of 
finance is not straightforward, and it may therefore be 
necessary to assume that the government allocations 
are already being made in the most efficient manner in 
meeting its sustainable development goals. Of course, 
should this not be the case, or should the investment 
result in significant savings in other parts of the econ-
omy, it may become subject to discussions about the 
financing shortfall.
 
Although NAMAs are supposed to establish a devia-
tion from a baseline or business as usual, the integra-
tion with general development policies may complicate 
such differentiation. Some NAMAs may therefore in 
a sense represent business as usual scenarios – or 
rather, 'development as planned' scenarios. In terms of 
NAMA financing, this is fundamentally an issue between 
the NAMA proponent and the financiers, including 
international financiers, of the action. A deviation from 
(a defined) baseline may be essential for (international) 
funding motivated by emissions reduction, but it is not 
essential for other sources of finance. National public 
financing will be motivated by immediate public good 
objectives, private-sector financing by profit motives. 
For example, investment in wind energy, even if part of 
a general energy policy, may be framed as a NAMA, the 
financing possibly consisting of national public, interna-
tional donor and private financing, with the entire finan-
cial package ultimately being labelled 'climate finance'.
 
Private investment motives
When the Clean Development Mechanism was devised 
in 1997, it was with the explicit intention to activate 
low-cost emissions reduction options in developing 
countries, substantiated by calculations of the marginal 
costs of abatement that showed the relatively higher 
abatement costs in developed countries compared to 
developing countries. However, the CDM experience 
seems not to confirm the assumptions that developed 
country investors would shift their investment strategies 
for the sake of emissions reductions or that invest-
ments with the aim of emissions reductions are moti-
vated by the lowest cost of reduction. 
 
More than 90% of investment capital bound up in CDM 
projects is local capital (see text box), and at least 75% 
of the investment capital has gone into projects that 
do not represent cost-efficient emissions reductions.2  
Experience from developed countries is similar: initiatives 
supported by national policies often disregard marginal 
abatement cost curves and move ahead with other more 
expensive alternatives (see Figure 1). Even though cost 
2 S.E. Lütken, ‘Penny Wise, Pound Foolish’, UNEP Risø Working Paper No. 1.
efficiency is not the prime motivator, the projects are not 
reckless reduction adventures. A number of other mo-
tivations were mentioned above. This does not prevent 
the activity from being listed as a NAMA. Prevention of 
investment in 'high-hanging fruits' activities in the tradi-
tional 'mitigation' understanding of the term is therefore 
not an objective in itself, nor are high costs of abatement 
a hindrance to the financial engineering of a NAMA.
 
 
The origin of investment in CDM projects has been 
estimated by the UNFCCC Secretariat during the 
2012 review of the CDM. As this information is not 
publicly disclosed by CDM project developers, the 
estimate is based on a project-by-project evaluation, 
as well as general market conditions in some of the 
largest CDM host countries. The UNFCCC Secre-
tariat arrives at an interval of USD 21.5-43.0 billion 
foreign direct investment (FDI) in CDM projects over 
the lifetime of the mechanism. UNEP Risø’s CD-
Mpipeline.org contains information about capital in-
vestment in about 8,000 out of more than 12,000 
recorded projects. Accumulated investment in the 
8,000 projects is USD 495 billion. Bringing these fig-
ures together reveals that FDI in CDM projects may 
stand as low as 3-6%, indicating that well above 
90% of the finance is being generated domestical-
ly. When compared to the value of issued CERs by 
mid-2013 – approximately USD 13 billion if issued 
CERs are set at an average value of USD 10 – cur-
rent carbon value represents less than 2% of the in-
vested capital (estimated at USD 750 billion). 
8Table 1. Summary of institutions created to enable implementation of  
the Convention
NAMAs and the CDM
NAMAs could be seen as the rising replacement for 
the CDM, but there are fundamental differences, most 
importantly that the CDM is a mechanism with detailed 
rules, while the NAMA is a concept practically without 
rules. Although current carbon market players have pro-
Figure 1. Relative costs of abatement
CDM NAMA
Definition One of the flexible mechanisms of the Kyoto 
Protocol. It provides 'where-flexibility' of emis-
sions reductions, thus allowing emissions 
reductions undertaken in a developing country 
to offset emissions in a developed country, 
typically through a trading agreement. 
Voluntary activities of Greenhouse Gas (GHG) 
emissions mitigation in developing countries 
that are not subject to mitigation commit-
ments under the UNFCCC.
Actions Projects and programmes of activities Policies, programmes and projects 
Initiator Private sector or public sector Typically public sector
Investment 
driver
Normal returns from the market that the 
project activity addresses with the addition 
of returns from Certified Emission Reduc-
tions (CERs). CERs are issued by the CDM 
Executive Board based on project verifica-
tion reports. CERs can be traded on carbon 
markets.
The sustainable development priorities of the 
host country, with possible added benefits 
from including emissions reductions in the 
policy planning. The NAMA may attract 
international financial participation and may 
include the generation of business opportuni-
ties for the private sector, which will invest 
from profit motives supported by the NAMA. 
Requirement Reductions in emissions must be additional 
to any that would occur in the absence of the 
certified project activity.
CDM to assist developing countries in 
achieving sustainable development.
A NAMA, framed in the context of sustain-
able development, aims at achieving a 
deviation in emissions relative to ‘business as 
usual’ emissions in 2020. 
Financing Upfront financing, generally through the 
private sector. Certificates are issued ex-post 
based on regular verification reports. CERs 
are sold on a carbon market.
Domestic resources and/or international sup-
port (e.g. through bilateral/multilateral agree-
ments, development banks) for the prepara-
tion and implementation of NAMAs.
Rulebook Marrakech Accords and subsequent body of CDM 
Executive Board decisions.
Limited guidance being developed under the Con-
vention. 
moted the inclusion of a crediting approach in NAMAs 
as well, the international climate negotiations have so 
far excluded this option. While NAMAs are expected to 
involve significant private-sector investment, not least in 
their financing, it does not foresee the emergence of a 
new or revitalized international carbon market. 
Source: UNDP/UNEP/UNFCCC (2013)  
Community solar PVEnergy efficiency Household solar PV
Cost of  
abatement
A shift from high to lower cost of 
abatement indicated by the arrow 
reduces costs, but remains far 
above the (negative) cost of energy 
efficiency initiatives.
9Defining NAMA finance
A definition of NAMA finance would be useful. In a tra-
ditional private-sector terminology like that illustrated in 
Figure 2, 'feasible' refers to projects that are technically 
and politically doable, basically disregarding the cost 
or making assumptions about the cost that justifies 
undertaking a study of the project’s feasibility. 'Viable' 
projects are feasible projects that, under realistic as-
sumptions, produce acceptable returns on investment 
as determined by the investor. But a project is 'bank-
able' only if such returns are produced with a sufficient 
level of certainty as perceived by third-party financiers, 
typically banks, and if they are convinced that the 
project can service the debt. Therefore, most financial 
engineering is about comforting the banks. 
That, too, will be true for the financial engineering of 
NAMAs, although to arrive at that juncture, the NAMA 
financing chain may be longer than in isolated private 
project finance. This is not as unfair as it may sound. 
Banks traditionally provide by far the largest share 
of total project financing, including in climate-related 
investment, and they do so at start up, when the risk 
is highest and all forecasts are put to the test. Banks 
depend on future cash flows to repay the loans, and 
unless cash flows as expected there is a risk of default. 
On the other hand, if cash flows more willingly than 
expected, banks do not have an upside, i.e. they only 
receive interest on the loan, not a share of the profits.
 
NAMAs focus on the fundamental drivers of invest-
ments in a country or sector, instead of isolating 
emissions reductions on a project-by-project basis. 
What are sought are financing models that can support 
this shift in focus. These models will call on the private 
sector to put its financial means to work for the sake 
of the climate, and on the public sector to devote its 
financial resources in ways that maximize the interests 
of the private sector to become involved. This is where 
the NAMA and the CDM come together, that is, in the 
objective to activate the private sector and its signifi-
cant financial capacity. 
Most actions encompassed by NAMAs will ultimately 
materialize in much the same form as CDM projects: 
physical assets that have a lower emissions profile 
than the business as usual alternative, and which are 
financed by the private sector. The two important les-
sons extracted above from the CDM are therefore very 
relevant, especially when financing models for NAMA 
implementation are being devised: 
1. The carbon asset is generally not sufficient to at-
tract FDI (about 95% of the investment capital in 
CDM projects is local)
 
2. Investment drivers are many, and CDM generally 
does not exploit the cheapest emissions reduction 
options
 
Figure 2. Feasibility, viability and bankability
Bankability
Viability
Feasibility
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The banks are the private sector's closest ally. If the pri-
vate sector's financial involvement in NAMAs is crucial 
(which it is in most NAMAs one way or the other), the 
financial engineering is about providing such conditions 
that allow the private sector and its banking partners to 
engage together. The financial engineering of NAMAs 
is not about convincing the banks to invest in sustain-
ability, nor is it about replacing the banks with other 
financiers. It can therefore be argued that 
NAMA finance is the financing that has to be 
engineered to allow the private sector and their 
banking partners to do their business as usual
 
i.e. investing in profitable business propositions, albeit 
in this context these investments must have emissions 
reduction benefits. This differentiates NAMA finance 
from climate finance, which normally seems to encom-
pass the entire investment in emission-friendly assets. 
It also pre-empts debate about what to finance. Some 
advocate budgeting on the basis of incremental costs, 
while others adopt a total cost approach. Incremental 
costs have been defined by the GEF as the differential 
between the costs of a baseline development and the 
costs incurred in a project or policy scenario, or the 
'additional costs associated with transforming a project 
with national benefits into one with global environmen-
tal benefits' (GEF 2011).3 The choice could be solar 
energy instead of conventional fossil fuel technologies. 
The lifetime cost difference between the two options 
is the incremental cost. Unfortunately such calcula-
3 GEF, 2011, http://www.thegef.org/gef/policy/incremental_costs
Figure 3. Financial engineering of NAMAs 
Figure 3a. Financial engineering of NAMAs  
Engineering the NAMA financing
Business 
opportunities 
and bank finance
Engineering the NAMA financing
Business 
opportunities 
and bank finance
Public-public partnerships
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tions are never that simple, and a number of decisions 
about what to include in the calculation and what not 
to include may obscure the picture. A third approach, 
which is the one adopted here, would be to structure 
the available national finance and the financing mod-
el and financial instruments as efficiently as possible, 
respecting national principal constraints (e.g. ownership 
structures in the energy sector) and devising a structure 
for the lowest cost option for filling the financing gap 
from international sources. This may or may not be the 
incremental cost.
The approach has profound consequences for the defi-
nition of what is 'inside' the NAMA financing structure 
and what is outside. If the private sector is neither likely 
nor presumed to revise its 'for profit' investment moti-
vation, only the public sector will be actively engaged 
in engineering the NAMA financing. The innovative 
capacity for NAMA financing is therefore to be rooted in 
public-public partnerships (see Figure 3a) and less so in 
public-private partnerships (PPP). PPP is instead a very 
important model for NAMA implementation.
Essentially, however, while the illustration indicates that 
the financial engineering of the NAMA succeeds in the 
public-public realm, it does not mean that the instru-
ments devised should not target private-sector actors. 
On the contrary, most instruments do.
The structuring of the following chapters follow the 
logic of Figure 3b, initially describing the sources of 
financing with a focus on public–public partnerships, 
but including other relevant sources of financing for the 
A city needs new city buses. The standard is a diesel 
bus seating seventy passengers. Such a bus can 
be bought for USD 50,000. Raising the standard 
to highly efficient hybrid buses instead will raise the 
price significantly (by a factor of three or four). These 
are incremental investment costs. The actual incre-
mental costs include the costs of operation as well. 
It might well be that the hybrid bus will save half or 
even all of the incremental investment costs over its 
lifetime so that in the end this high capital cost solu-
tion comes out less disadvantageous. But lower op-
erational costs do not easily convert into investment 
capital, which is why the world is full of low-cost, 
low-quality, low-efficiency equipment that is expen-
sive to run during its often limited operational life. 
Meeting this challenge would be a major achieve-
ment of NAMA finance.
Figure 3b. Financial engineering of NAMAs – and distinguishing NAMA finance from 
climate finance  
Business 
opportunities Engineering the NAMA financingPublic-publicpartnerships
Financing
sources
InstrumentationSource
NAMA Finance
Deployment
public sector-led financial engineering of a NAMA. The 
following chapter presents the instruments commonly 
used by the public sector (national or international) 
to promote a desirable development leading to the 
final discussion of activating the private sector and its 
financing capacity.
Box 2: Incremental costs?
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The financing sources related to NAMAs fall into four 
categories:
Main sources  
of NAMA Finance
These can further be divided into an array of finan-
cial sources and financial instruments and, in terms 
of NAMAs, a number of typical interventions through 
which sources and instruments are deployed. The divi-
sion on domestic and foreign sources of finance reflects 
the international negotiating texts on NAMAs, such as 
FCCC/AWGLCA/2010/8.
The Green Climate Fund (GCF) is probably the source 
for NAMA financing one immediately thinks of, although 
it is still in its early inception stage. The eventual aim 
is to mobilize up to US$100 billion annually for invest-
ments in developing country mitigation and adaptation 
actions. The emphasis is on 'mobilize'. Even when 
operational, the GCF will be only one of a multitude 
of financial sources and institutions that the NAMA 
developer may engage. In addition to the four sources 
of finance just mentioned, there are institutions and 
instruments in between, which are also described in 
this chapter. They are added in Figure 4. At the nation-
al level these are first and foremost the banks – the 
private sector's closest allies, which provide investment 
and operational finance for local business and business 
development. In addition, at the international level there 
are 'hybrids' that operate in the intersection between 
public and private. These may become increasingly 
important actors in the financial engineering of NAMAs 
and are described at the end of this chapter.
Figure 4. Linking the four sources of finance through banks and hybrid  
financing institutions  
Public
Domiestic
Public
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Private
Domiestic
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Domestic public funding
In accordance with the relationship between transfor-
mational NAMAs and operational budgets as estab-
lished in the previous chapter, the first obvious source 
of funds for the financing of NAMAs is the NAMA host 
country's current national budget. NAMAs are imple-
mented in the context of sustainable development in a 
NAMA host country, thus the starting point is to look at 
the budgetary allocation for plans to achieve sustain-
able development goals that are ultimately also to be 
delivered by the NAMA. The reason for this is twofold: 
1) most activities or public-sector services with emis-
sions reductions potentials already enjoy public-sector 
budgetary allocations; and 2) there are very few alterna-
tive sources for operational budgets.
Budgets consist of investment and operational ex-
penses, the latter resulting in cash flows. While it may 
be relatively straightforward to redirect one-time invest-
ments towards less emission-intensive alternatives if 
sufficient investment budget can be made available, 
cash flows may be more difficult to change, as they are 
expressions of current (old) habits and 'business-as-
usual' operations. The flexibility with which budgets can 
be spent or revised is therefore essential. This flex-
ibility is determined by the ministries of finance or their 
equivalents, as well as local government institutions 
and the administrative mandates delegated to sector 
ministries and sub-national levels.
 
The current use of funds allocated within such sectors 
of activity is the obvious first option for identifying finan-
cial resources for NAMA implementation.
Because of the lack of investment budgets, financially 
constrained public sectors have increasing sought to 
turn investment budgets into cash flow through models 
that involve the private sector's financial capacities. 
This happened through the BOT (Build, Own/Operate, 
Transfer) model in the 1990s, and today it happens 
through the PPP (Public–Private Partnership), the dif-
ference between the two mainly semantic. This model 
is probably one of the most important vehicles to bring 
the private sector on board in NAMA development and 
implementation, and will be discussed further later. 
If sufficient budget is available within the targeted sec-
tor of activity, but current prioritization does not encour-
age low-emission alternatives, a first step would be 
to establish to what extent such prioritization can be 
changed. For instance, if a waste collection system is 
in place and waste is disposed of as landfill, increased 
recycling would require a change of collection sched-
ules and possibly alternative means of collection (i.e. 
a possible change of contractor). In theory the same 
amount of waste will have to be collected, and thus the 
collection budget would remain grossly unchanged, as 
opposed to a situation in which no collection system is 
in place. 
If net cost increases are necessary to achieve a pro-
posed reduction of emissions, other line ministries' 
budgets could be explored. NAMA initiatives in one 
sector may result in sustainable development benefits 
in another. These are what are normally referred to as 
'co-benefits'. Such co-benefits may be the true drivers 
of initiatives, or they may be real positive externalities, 
such as the obvious health benefits from environmental 
improvements, although such benefits would probably 
only occur with a sizeable time lag and be overshad-
owed by other expense increases in the health sector. 
Cross-subsidizing, which would be the term for such 
models, would therefore normally need to have costs 
and benefits occur at about the same time and to 
have a clear linkage between cause and effect. This 
also would occur if the reallocation from one sector to 
another would not affect the sustainable development 
benefits for which the original allocation was made. A 
solar PV programme rolled out in a rural area with no 
grid connection could induce savings on subsidies for 
fuel (diesel or kerosene), and such savings would occur 
at about the same time as the investments in solar PV 
sets (with possible additional investment financing by 
households). 
The domestic private sector
Private business, households and the private financial 
sector are the three distinct private-sector agents. In 
most countries there will also be a number of state-
controlled privatized entities. The banks are regarded 
as the implicit financing partner for the private sector, 
as described in Chapter 2, and they play a central role 
in activating (or deactivating) the private businesses' 
and the households' financing capacity. Banks do not 
act on their own. 
Private-sector agents are equally unlikely to act on their 
own to reduce emissions in any decisive manner, but 
they may be prompted to act if they are made aware 
of options that have tangible benefits for themselves. 
In most cases immediately tangible benefits are of an 
economic nature through savings mainly of energy 
and water, and sometimes in relation to transportation. 
Trade-offs are usually related to convenience, although 
in many instances investment barriers prevent the 
choice of high efficiency-high cost technology alterna-
tives. Even if such barriers can be overcome through 
the involvement of the banks, the efficient alternatives 
may lose out when different priorities are competing for 
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scarce resources. For instance, in business, the consol-
idation or expansion of market positions will typically be 
preferred over cost savings. In households, particularly 
in transition economies, a multitude of wishes stand in 
line, and long-term cost considerations may not be at 
the top of the list. 
The private sector operates in a regulatory environ-
ment established by the public sector. It is used to a 
steady flow of regulatory changes and normally prefers 
to comply, although circumventions may be more or 
less prevalent. Regulation is discussed as part of the 
instruments available for climate finance in the following 
chapter. At this juncture it suffices to stress that activa-
tion of the private sector's financing capacity is likely 
to require regulation that either incentivises or imposes 
action. 
Incentives schemes mean that action is voluntary. CDM 
is the obvious example of a voluntary scheme, the 
carbon asset being the intended incentive for invest-
ment. The drawback is that the ability of incentives to 
inspire action is difficult to predict. They may or may 
not influence the prioritization process in households, 
and they may or may not move, for example, efficiency 
investments higher up the agenda for private busi-
ness. For the public sector they are therefore difficult to 
budget. Incentives may be economic or may consist of 
purely inspirational information campaigns. Economic 
incentives may be positive as well as negative (disin-
centives): for example, a reduction in a fuel subsidy is 
a disincentive for fuel consumption, while a financing 
scheme for the exchange of electric water heaters is an 
incentive to use solar water heating. Common to both 
is the fact that they exploit the private sector’s financing 
and payment capacity and willingness provided they 
are designed in a sufficiently robust manner to make 
the banks play along when required.
International public funds
Public international financing stems from a diverse 
group of institutions, including the World Bank, the 
regional development banks, the UN system, and 
a multitude of national and supra-national bilateral 
funding agencies like the GEF, EU Development, GIZ, 
DFID and USaid. A complete overview can be found in 
UNEP Risø Centre/GEF's guide Accessing International 
Financing for Climate Change Mitigation: A Guidebook 
for Developing Countries.4
 
The international public funding institutions have differ-
ent mandates and funding platforms, which influence 
4 UNEP Risø Centre on Energy, Climate and Sustainable Development, 
2012, Roskilde, Denmark.
their priorities and modes of operation. Traditional 
development assistance programmes, and now also 
climate change-related assistance, mainly provide 
grants. The budgets for these grant programmes stem 
from donor countries' annual finance bills. Therefore, 
budgets fluctuate and are subject to changing priorities 
in the political foundations of these programmes. Grant 
programmes, therefore, are generally short-term financ-
ing options that only last as long as the implementation 
period of the programme, which is rarely longer than 
five years. This is why, so far, most developed-country 
NAMA financing has been for the preparation of NA-
MAs, technical assistance, capacity-building, sector 
strategies and other activities that are not related to 
physical assets. Donors may also occasionally engage 
in pilot projects, but due to their funding platforms they 
are generally unable to engage in permanent transfor-
mational changes that require permanent alterations of 
cash flows in a targeted sector. Grants in their tradi-
tional application mode are therefore less relevant for 
the financial engineering of NAMAs.
This is a significant gap in the current financial land-
scape for NAMAs, one that needs to be addressed 
through product development among donors. A 
number of options exist, particularly in expanding the 
array of guarantee products, including guarantees for 
governments and local investors, increasing the reach 
of mixed credit schemes into green mixed credits, 
increasing the use of green bonds to lower financing 
costs, and a number of other options that urgently 
need to be developed and deployed, rather than al-
locating funds to private-sector investment vehicles 
where finance is plentiful (see S. E. Lütken 2014 for an 
expanded overview of potential financial products).
The resulting investments in physical assets require 
longer term financing. Loan-financing, potentially con-
cessional, is available from bank-type institutions (World 
Bank, regional development banks, European Invest-
ment Bank, KfW etc.) either to NAMA host-country 
governments, or to the private sector if policies and 
regulations encourage such private-sector engage-
ment. In that case the financing is available through 
hybrid financiers, development finance institutions that 
operate with private-sector conditions (see later).
 
International private finance:  
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)
When the CDM was created, it was thought it would 
eventually divert billions of investment dollars from de-
veloped to developing countries. However, a number of 
factors keep foreign investors from investing in political-
ly sensitive services like energy and water. Such invest-
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ments are normally long-term, low-yield investments 
that, among many other risks, face one in particular: 
commonly there is only one off-taker of the service, a 
typical monopsony, be it a grid company, a ministry of 
transport, a municipal waste-collection department or 
another public entity that has the political responsibil-
ity for organizing the public service in their respective 
jurisdiction. The fact that the CDM has been unable to 
mobilize any noteworthy investment capital from devel-
oped countries (see text box in chapter 2) reflects two, 
possibly three important realizations:
1. investments have overwhelmingly been made in 
countries that can raise investment capital domesti-
cally
2. attracting investment capital from developed 
countries to developing countries requires much 
stronger incentives than the CDM has been able to 
deliver in its current form
3. the inherent risks, including regulatory risks, in-
volved in many types of CDM projects, which are 
not addressed by the mechanism, remains a deter-
rent to foreign investment
The third of these realizations is an assumption, though 
it has been indirectly confirmed by the Climate Policy 
Initiative in a 2013 report (see Chapter 5).
 
FDI is often a mixed blessing. While it has the potential 
to stimulate economic growth by creating jobs, in some 
cases it also resembles selling the family silver, espe-
cially if central infrastructure is the object of investment. 
The track record of the 1990s BOT projects is not 
always the best reference point when foreign inves-
tors are invited to make key infrastructure investments. 
Expectations on both sides must be clear and trans-
parent. That is why a 'partnership' is called for in PPPs 
that fundamentally does the same as the BOT.
The foreign investor may deploy his investment capital 
anywhere in the world. Unless there are very good rea-
sons to invest in country X, neighbouring country Y is 
also an option. When evaluating the options, the foreign 
investor will look at the investment climate – the regula-
tor's attitude and past actions – and at the options for 
taking out an insurance against regulatory risks in for 
example, an export credit agency that prices the guar-
antee according to the relevant NAMA host-country 
risk classification set by the OECD. Some developing 
countries do not even have a risk rating or are rated in 
the highest risk class of 7, which in itself is a significant 
deterrent to investment. 
Prior to investing, foreign direct investors are obvi-
ously out of reach of the NAMA host-country regulator. 
Therefore a number of considerations relevant to the 
national public–private relationship do not apply to the 
foreign investor. Only when he is firmly established in 
the NAMA host country will the national regulations 
apply. Attracting FDI is therefore mainly a question of 
offering attractive investment options with appealing 
risk/return ratios. In many cases it can be impossible 
for NAMA host countries to establish such conditions 
without assistance through international public–public 
partnerships.
 
Private international finance also includes hundreds of 
venture capitalists, as listed, for example, on the web-
sites of the European Venture Capital Association www.
evca.eu or the American National Venture Capital As-
sociation (www.nvca.org), with more than four hundred 
members. Most of these venture capitalists focus on 
national or developed country investments, but they are 
increasingly looking into emerging markets. Overall, the 
amount of financing potentially brought to the table by 
the private sector is significant – and would probably be 
sufficient to meet to investment needs – provided condi-
tions are sufficiently conducive. If investments fall short, it 
will be because the conditions are not conducive.
Hybrid sources of financing
The hybrid financiers fall into three groups
1. Privately operated investment funds with public 
capital 
2. Export credit agencies (ECAs) providing insurance 
for FDI backed by their government 
3. Private philanthropic foundations
1)  Publicly owned investment institutions with public 
capital targeting private-sector investment are indeed 
development institutions, but they are established with 
a specific profit objective in mind. Their core capital 
is public and is devoted to business development 
objectives in developing countries. The International 
Finance Corporation (IFC) within the World Bank group 
is probably the best known of these institutions, but 
practically all developed countries have established 
such institutions as part of their development assis-
tance activities. For instance www.edfi.eu provides an 
overview of European development finance institutions, 
including the well-known German KFW. Other devel-
opment banks like the Nordic Investment Bank or the 
regional development banks (ADB, AsDB, IDB, EBRD) 
have investment-for-profit activities embedded within 
the banks' overall operations as a separate window or 
else have established dedicated private-sector initia-
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tives. The document Accessing International Financing 
for Climate Change Mitigation: A Guidebook for Devel-
oping Countries has further details of these institutions. 
Among themselves these institutions have a wide array 
of investment products and investment structures 
available for the support of private-sector development 
and investment, and some of them are establishing 
new structures specifically in support of climate-related 
business development. One example is the British–
German NAMA Facility or the Danish KIF (the Climate 
Investment Fund).
2) Developed countries' export credit agencies (ECAs) 
are ultimately guaranteed by their host governments, 
but they operate as private-sector insurance entities 
providing a range of guarantee products for invest-
ments abroad. A comprehensive list can be found on, 
for example, the Danish ECAs (EKF) website.5  The 
provision of risk guarantees is indispensable when it 
comes to bringing foreign investors into sectors that 
are dependent on public-sector regulation, as is the 
case for a significant proportion of NAMAs. The ECAs 
are therefore central if FDI is expected to play any role 
in the leveraged NAMA financing. These funds can be 
actively engaged in discussions of structures that can 
attract the private sector, particularly the foreign direct 
investor. If the expectation for future climate financing 
is a high degree of leveraging, which is the same as a 
significant involvement of private-sector capital, these 
institutions should be anticipated to play very signifi-
cant roles in the future structuring of climate finance, 
including the financial engineering of NAMAs. It is, 
therefore, a very good place to start when considering 
NAMA finance. The involvement of such hybrid devel-
opment capital is a comfort factor for other investors, 
among them pension funds that devote part of their 
capital to venture investments and that are increasingly 
also focusing on climate change-related investments. 
Pensions funds usually do not have much capacity for 
due diligence, therefore they will typically follow inves-
tors with good due diligence capacity or those, like the 
hybrids, that have a built-in risk-mitigation effect.
 
3)  Private philanthropic foundations have been in exis-
tence and have provided altruistic funding for a multi-
tude of purposes for more than a century through funds 
like the Rockefeller Foundation or the Ford Foundation, 
and by now more than 70,000 others in the US alone. 
In addition, given that most donations are stand-alone 
interventions that reflect the founder's or foundation's 
particular values, it becomes more than difficult to 
define a strategy for the involvement of philanthropic 
5 http://www.ekf.dk/en/WhatWeDo/Products/Pages/default.aspx
foundations in financing a NAMA. But the landscape of 
private philanthropy has evolved over the past couple 
of decades towards embracing the principles and con-
cepts of the private sector. The change in approach by 
some but certainly not all trustees favours mission-relat-
ed investment (MRI) and fits particularly well with finan-
cial structures for NAMAs that 'require the provision of 
finance that is either more patient, less risk averse, less 
demanding in terms of return on investment or general-
ly just more flexible as long as the promise is a transfor-
mational change that, if truly successful and according 
to plan, will return the investment to the fund'.6 
 
Through this change in approach, philanthropic funds 
have come very close to adopting investment strategies 
that are akin to the hybrids. The funds can well be seen 
as investors in hybrid investment vehicles, which relieve 
them of the demanding project-level due-diligence pro-
cesses for which they, like the pension funds, have only 
limited resources. The challenge, however, is to match 
supply and demand, and for the NAMA developer to 
realize that even among the philanthropists there is a 
growing belief that there is no reason to waste philan-
thropic private-sector capital on actions that could have 
been turned into profitable businesses.
6 S.E. Lütken, Financial Engineering of Climate Investment in Developing 
Countries: Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Action and How to Finance It, 
Anthem Press, 2014.
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The financial engineering of NAMAs is mostly a matter 
of using existing financial instruments to ensure de-
sirable investments from a climate change mitigation 
perspective, and less about developing new ones.7 The 
four main actors (public, private, national and interna-
tional) have different instruments at their disposal and 
different capabilities in terms of the development and 
deployment of these instruments.
 
The types of instruments available in financial engineering 
can be categorized broadly according to their focus on:
1. cash flow,
2. asset finance, or
3. risk mitigation.
 
These types of financing or instruments are regarded 
differently by private- and public-sector actors respec-
tively. Whereas the private sector invests on the basis 
of the size and quality of the expected cash flows and 
the returns on investment, the public sector's prioritiza-
tion of a multitude of purposes in a finance bill might be 
driven by cost efficiency, but rarely by considerations 
of profitability. While the two thus may evaluate actions 
differently, they both distinguish asset investment, 
called capital expenditure or 'capex', from cash flow or 
operational costs and revenues.
 
7 Although for a range of optional new instruments; see S.E. Lütken, Finan-
cial Engineering of Climate Investment in Developing Countries: Nationally 
Appropriate Mitigation Action and How to Finance It, Anthem Press, 2014.
It is the public sector's prerogative to invest even if there 
is no cash flow at all. Such investments are typically 
'public goods' investment like roads, parks, street lights 
or operational costs like pension schemes and educa-
tion. Many climate change adaptation investments fall 
into this category, such as protection against rising water 
levels and changing weather patterns, whereas deciding 
how to regard investments for mitigation is less straight-
forward. Most mitigation investments do involve cash 
flow (also without a carbon market) and may be made 
subject to 'polluter pays' principles. The latter, however, 
requires a willingness to tax the polluter. The private sec-
tor will not 'contribute' without being taxed to do so. 
Another difference between public and private is the 
consideration of risk. Private investment is not driven 
by profitability alone, but rather by risk/return consider-
ations. A greater risk should be rewarded with a greater 
return. Risks are barriers that need to be overcome or 
removed to mobilize private capital. Certain risks and 
risk levels are acceptable, others are not. That means 
that on the one hand not all risks need to be removed 
entirely, but on the other hand not all risks can be 
compensated for by a higher return. The stakes are 
different in public sector investment. In fact, in project 
investment the public sector, in its role as regulator, is 
commonly regarded as a significant source of risk.
Figure 5 adds these additional dimensions over and 
above the basic differentiation of the six sources in 
NAMA financing. 
Instruments
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Most financing instruments currently in the toolbox are 
focused on capital investment, but the three types are 
closely interlinked: equity (capital investment) is only put 
at risk if predictable cash flows provide acceptable re-
turns on investment; acceptable returns, expressed as 
a risk/return relation, depend on options for risk cover, 
which again determines the structuring of the financing 
and influences the demand for cash flow resulting from 
the cost of the finance. 
Table 2 lists the different instruments relevant mostly 
to private-sector investors, assuming that these are 
ultimately the investors that are preferably to be incen-
tivized through the financial engineering of NAMAs. In 
practice, however, the provision of private equity as de-
fined in Chapter 2 happens only when all other financial 
instruments have been orchestrated. Thus, for the sake 
of clarity, these other financial instruments, which are 
mostly in the hands of the public regulator in the role 
of NAMA initiator or initial financier, are presented first. 
They are regarded as 'non-market-based instruments', 
although their purpose is exactly to create, or alter, 
market conditions.
Figure 5. Dimensions of NAMA finance 
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Table 2. Financial instruments
Instrument Characteristics Typical providers
Equity Investments made directly in projects or operating assets by 
investors that take ownership in accordance with their provi-
sion of capital 
Private companies, indivi-
duals, venture funds, publicly 
funded venture funds  
(hybrids), pension funds
Mezzanine 
(first loss)
A tranche of finance that, in the event of a default, takes the 
first loss before other tranches of finance. Also called mezza-
nine finance or sometimes ‘junior debt’. May be regarded as a 
hybrid of debt and equity
Private companies, venture 
funds, publicly funded ven-
ture funds (hybrids)
Loans Traditional debt finance on standard terms (market rate and 
tenor), commonly provided by banks, including development 
banks 
Banks, development banks, 
publicly funded venture funds 
(hybrids), pension funds
Soft loans Loans on favourable terms (below market price) with low inter-
est rates, long maturities and possible grace periods. A subset 
of soft loans are mixed credits that under OECD rules must 
contain at least a 35% grant element 
Bilateral donors (through 
commercial banks), multilat-
eral development banks
Dedicated 
credit lines
Lines of credit (debt finance) for investing in projects that meet 
specified criteria, e.g. related to climate change. Credit lines are 
typically established by development banks or less commonly 
by public entities (government agencies) channelled through a 
private-sector bank or financial institution for the financing of 
(most often) private-sector initiatives  
Multilateral and bilateral de-
velopment banks
Risk cover 
instruments,
Guarantees
Several instruments provided by either the public or the private 
sector, most often in the form of insurances against certain 
events. Governments will typically be providing political (policy) 
guarantees, government agencies may be insuring such guar-
antees; private-sector entities may be providing technical (tech-
nology) risk cover. Guarantees (except government guarantees) 
are paid for like an insurance policy 
Export credit agencies, insur-
ance companies, banks, 
governments, technology 
suppliers 
Project 
finance
Financing structured around a project’s own operating cash 
flows and assets, without requiring additional financial guar-
antees by the project sponsors. Loans in a project finance 
structure are also called 'non-recourse' lending. Project finance 
essentially depends on the structuring of the risk through risk 
cover instruments
All of the above  
Bonds A debt investment in which an investor lends money to an 
entity (corporate or governmental) that borrows the funds for a 
defined period of time at a fixed interest rate. The bond (i.e. the 
debt) may be traded on an exchange and bought by anyone
Financial arrangers like banks 
and credit institutions, large 
corporations, governments 
Grant Provision of funds without expectation of repayment, using 
government budgetary allocations, and/or international financial 
institution or donor funds. For example, funds provided to pay 
up-front cost of measures or projects
Bilateral donors, philanthropic 
funds
Carbon 
credits
Certificates proving the reduction of 1 ton of CO2e, whether 
traded on the basis of Emissions Reduction Purchase Agree-
ments, over the counter or in formal emission trading systems 
like the EU ETS 
Project developers/owners, 
the carbon market(s)
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Non-market-based instruments 
Table 2 presents financial instruments that pertain to a 
financial market. However, the public-sector regulator 
can activate private investment through either regula-
tion or incentive (see Table 3).  These instruments are 
often referred to as 'non-market mechanisms'.  Regula-
tion is commonplace – that is what government is all 
about. The private sector is used to regulation and is 
not against it as long as it is predictable, non-discrimi-
nating and does not erode business competitiveness. 
Particularly in sectors like the energy sector, where 
investment horizons are very long, the predictability of 
regulatory regimes is crucial. If regulation is not in con-
formity with these three requirements, the private sec-
tor, and particularly the foreign investor, will stay away.
Table 3. Public-sector intervention modes 
to encourage private investment
Instruments
Grants
Purchase of assets
Fixed payment for services
Additional payment, subsidies (e.g. feed-in tariffs)
Removing subsidies
Tax
Tax credits/reductions/exemptions
Variable or accelerated depreciation
Guarantee schemes
Loan schemes
Technology standards (forcing investment)
Source: Inspired by UNEP RISØ (2011) (Low Carbon Development 
Strategies)
Regulation is a good way to activate especially the 
profitable emissions reduction options that are found 
in energy efficiency programmes. The private sector 
would, of course, have to reallocate investment capital 
against its immediate inclinations, but being regulated 
into making a profitable investment is less of a burden 
than being imposed a direct cost.
 
If action is imposed, there must be an assurance that 
the burden will be bearable for all targeted households 
or corporations. Imposing investments may have to be 
accompanied by a government-supported or gov-
ernment-arranged financing model that can distribute 
the investment costs over a longer period of time. 
Such models, for example, in the form of microfinance 
schemes, might attract international donor support. 
If levies or taxes are imposed to serve as a source for 
financing for a particular action, possibly as part of a 
cross-subsidization scheme, it is obviously crucial that 
the revenue be ring-fenced against any pressure to 
divert it to other purposes. If unsustainable conduct in 
one sector is to support sustainable conduct in anoth-
er, the revenue has to be dependable. Carbon taxes in 
a number of developed countries are an example of a 
tax that relies on the continued use of fossil fuels and 
has become an important contributor to the gener-
al government budget. Once fossil fuels have been 
phased out, the tax has to be replaced by a new tax on 
renewable energy. Purpose-specific levies are therefore 
in danger of becoming part of the overall government 
revenue stream and eventually consumed for other 
purposes. A tax on fuel or a reduction in a fuel subsidy 
may provide the basis for a financing instrument that 
can support, for example, the imposed exchange of 
electric water heaters into solar water heaters. Such a 
model requires setting the tax at a level that does not 
significantly reduce the unsustainable conduct. If that 
happens, the revenues will not arrive and the model 
falls apart. A modest reduction in fuel consumption 
would be the objective, while ensuring that the reve-
nues are not diverted to other purposes.
The non-market-based mechanisms are not financ-
ing models per se, but instruments that impose ac-
tions that require financing. In some cases, where the 
financial burden on each legal entity, be it a person or a 
company, is small compared to paying capacity, financ-
ing will stem from the reallocation of current spending. 
In other cases where the financing burden is higher, 
the traditional financial instruments listed in Table 2 will 
have to be activated, whether as a result of the regulat-
ed entities’ own initiative or initiated by the regulator as 
part of the regulation.
Asset financing
Traditional loan instruments will ultimately provide the 
lion's share of climate and NAMA financing. Loans exist 
in different forms apart from traditional bank financing, 
the most interesting probably being the soft loan model 
that is a hybrid instrument involving development as-
sistance. Many renewable energy and energy efficiency 
projects have been financed through this model, which 
is regulated by the OECD Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC). DAC has set a minimum of a 35% 
grant element for soft loans, usually resulting in interest-
free loans with an additional reduction of the principal. 
Traditional soft loans often come with strings attached 
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in the form of 'national content' requirements that set 
minimums for supplies stemming from the country of 
origin of the mixed credit.
Another loan instrument is the bond. The green bond 
has become an increasingly realistic financing vehicle 
with significant potentials for bringing in private capital 
to climate-related investments. Because it is a liquid 
asset, it is attractive to institutional investors with no ca-
pacity for project-specific due diligence. Bonds are at-
tractive due to their typically longer maturities and lower 
prices compared to bank loans, depending on the risk 
rating. It may become one of the central building blocks 
for the financing of NAMAs, particularly if combined 
with other means and instruments. The World Bank 
and IFC have already floated green bonds for billions of 
dollars.
 
An important instrument for bridging financing gaps is 
mezzanine financing or 'first loss'. Most hybrid financi-
ers offer mezzanine capital, which is basically a loan 
that can be converted into equity if the project is getting 
into arrears or at risk of doing so. Such conversion 
eases the strain on the project as the lender accepts 
that interest will no longer be paid, only dividends if the 
operation succeeds and the project survives. If it does 
not, the loan-turned-equity is lost together with the 
original equity, hence the name 'first loss'. The Climate 
Policy Initiative8 identified protection against first loss as 
one of the crucial instruments required to free additional 
investment capital for climate investment. Such protec-
tion would fall under the risk cover instruments.
Risk cover
Any investment is subject to risks. Financial engineering 
is as much an exercise in risk avoidance, risk mitigation 
and risk management and distribution as in putting to-
gether a financing plan. Fundamentally, a technological 
risk should be allocated to the technology provider to a 
reasonable extent, a currency risk should be hedged by 
the banks, and a regulatory or political risk should be 
neutralized to the extent possible by the regulator. Risk 
mitigation is the key to known and tested models for 
putting together financial instruments in project finance 
and therefore in many cases also in NAMA finance.
 
"Currently, gaps in risk coverage hinder renewable 
energy investments. Risk — whether real or perceived 
— is in fact the single most important factor preventing 
renewable energy projects from finding financial inves-
tors, or raising the returns that these investors demand. 
It is also one thing that policymakers can cause, con-
8 Risk Gaps: First-Loss Protection Mechanisms, CPI, January 2013.
trol, alleviate, or help mitigate."9 The regulatory environ-
ment, which is the prime point of interaction between 
the public and private sectors, is thus one of the prime 
obstacles to the financial engineering of NAMAs. While, 
of course, only a part of the NAMAs concerns renew-
able energy, many relate to public services that affect 
citizens and are therefore politically sensitive and may 
ultimately lead to the non-enforcement of consumer 
payments. The private sector is not equipped to tackle 
such risks and will be looking for insurance. Project 
companies may attempt to enter take-or-pay contracts 
with a public utility, but that only means that the risk is 
now on the public utility – the project company's only 
customer – and the public utility may be unable to pay 
if consumers do not pay their bills.
While this particular risk cover may be in short sup-
ply, there are other useful risk-mitigation products on 
the market. The main shortcoming of these risk cover 
instruments is, however, that they are generally only 
available to foreign investors. The local private sector 
in NAMA host countries does not have access to risk 
cover, despite being exposed to largely the same risks.
 
Grants
Grants are easily understandable, but they are few and 
far between for the implementation of NAMAs. The 
Global Environment Facility may be the only real source 
of grant financing for climate investment. However, 
the GEF requires significant co-financing. GEF itself 
states that its requirements are probably among the 
most burdensome among climate financiers. Grants, 
however, in one form or another, may be necessary to 
bring generally unprofitable actions to materialization. 
No matter how ingenious the financial engineering of 
the NAMA, there may be a leftover cost that needs to 
be accommodated. This might ultimately have to be 
covered through a form of grant, but it does not have to 
be a grant for the asset: it might alternatively be a grant 
offered on top of existing cash flows. 
Cash flow: carbon credits  
and other options
Few if any instruments are targeted at the provision 
of long-term cash flows. Such instruments would be 
incompatible with the way in which traditional donor 
funding is allocated. However, one of the main criteria 
for the transformational changes sought for in NAMAs 
is that incentives structures in a given sector are altered 
towards a preference for more desirable investment 
alternatives. This requires a permanent change to the 
cash flows. 
9 climate-l, 22nd January 2013, and http://climatepolicyinitiative.org/publica-
tion/risk-gaps/
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The list of instruments in Table 2 is short of such 
options. The CDM is practically the only instrument 
designed to provide such cash flows, but as future 
cash flows from the carbon market cannot be insured it 
cannot serve as collateral for raising investment capital. 
Even a reformed CDM is unlikely to reinvigorate carbon 
credit-based cash flows, but 'new market mechanisms' 
may reinvent the credit for domestic purposes – a trend 
which is growing rapidly. 
Another option for long-term cash flows is feed-in 
tariffs, typically in the energy sector, but other fixed pay-
ments for desired services in waste, water, transport or 
other public sector-administered services are equally 
relevant. Such favourable tariffs are generally offered by 
the public sector or public sector-controlled entities and 
require a public-sector budget. Such budgets are diffi-
cult to bring about, and in times of crisis they are at risk 
of erosion. Denting into such schemes is detrimental to 
the private sector's trust in their stability, and guaran-
tees are in demand – but rarely in supply. The United 
States' Overseas Private Investment Corporation 
(OPIC) has pioneered a feed-in-tariff insurance prod-
uct which provides policy risk coverage in developing 
countries, but these are clearly unavailable to domestic 
investors in NAMA host countries.
  
If the transformational changes sought for in NAMAs 
particularly require a permanent change in cash flows, 
the NAMA host-country regulator is thus faced with the 
challenge of either imposing a domestic cap-and-trade 
system on its domestic private sector or of commit-
ting itself to a long-term feed-in-tariff approach in one 
or more emissions reduction-relevant sectors,10 being 
aware that once established it will be a recurring line of 
expenditure on the finance bill for twenty or more years 
to come. 
It is fundamentally the financing of these additional 
costs that constitutes the core challenge in the financial 
engineering of NAMAs, mainly because donor-based 
sources of such financing cannot commit themselves 
to long-term cash flow contributions. Mechanisms are 
needed that can transform one-time budgetary alloca-
tions from any donor administered programme, includ-
ing the Green Climate Fund, into long-term cash flows. 
Such 'exchange mechanisms' should become central 
instruments in the financial engineering of NAMAs. In 
the meantime, instruments for reducing the size of the 
bill can stand in, for example, by reducing the financing 
costs for investors and thus the latter’s demands for 
additional payments. 
10 A feed-in tariff normally pertains to renewable energy, but it is just one 
example of ‘additional payment’ for services, as indicated in Table 3.
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'Leveraging' is the common term for describing the 
fact that much NAMA funding is ultimately expected 
to originate from sources other than dedicated public 
international NAMA financing, for example, to be chan-
nelled through the Green Climate Fund. Leveraging is 
not a new term but a common concept in the financial 
sector. The following example is from the UNFCCC/
UNDP/UNEP NAMA Guidance: 'If I have 100 dollars, 
how many additional investors can I attract for an in-
vestment by putting up my 100 dollars? That depends 
on two crucial factors: the identity of the owner of the 
100 dollars and how he intends to spend it.' Also here, 
investment should be distinguished from cash flow. 
Leverage in the public sense can also be a challenging 
concept to employ since its definition implies that the 
investment being leveraged would not proceed on its 
own ‘but for’ the public contribution. As with the CDM, 
proving this additionality can be tricky. In the best case 
this condition holds true and the public finance ‘crowds 
in’ private finance. In the middle case the public money 
helps to finance the activity alongside private invest-
ment, but the one does not leverage the other: the 
public and private actors are simply co-financiers in 
a project. In the worst case, the availability of public 
financing, often concessional, actually ‘crowds out’ 
private investment.
If a major part of future climate finance is to be lev-
eraged from the private sector, and particularly the 
international private sector, the first consideration 
when planning a NAMA must be to determine its role. 
If NAMAs are to leverage international private-sector 
financing, the international private sector will dictate the 
conditions for its commitment of capital. It is not at all 
certain that the activity in question for a NAMA tradi-
tionally involves the private sector. In many countries 
the energy sector is publicly owned, and there may be 
no plans or desire to change that. Therefore, the two 
routes of financing – public and private – will remain. 
The public-sector route, however, has fewer instru-
ments to employ, and will not be able to benefit from 
the private sectors' financing capacity.
No magic formula will eliminate the additional cost that 
is affiliated with some – but certainly not all – activities 
that can be considered as prospective NAMAs. Such 
costs will not be addressed by 'innovative financial 
sources', but they may be addressed in part through 
innovative ways of employing already known sources 
of finance, the purpose of which would be to signifi-
cantly reduce the cost in the same way as a 5% loan is 
cheaper to service than a 10% loan. And this – in all its 
simplicity – is the basic objective of the financial engi-
neering of NAMAs: to reduce the costs of financing by 
employing a multitude of financial instruments, includ-
ing risk mitigation instruments, so that more projects, 
programmes and policies are pushed upwards in the 
fundamental investment pyramid in Figure 3.
Who goes first?
Leveraging normally involves a financier in a leading 
role. In NAMA development, the leading financier is 
typically a domestic, public institution. Demonstrating 
the ability to mobilize national resources, either through 
a revision of government budgets or by showing a will-
ingness to regulate the private sector, is a good starting 
point. 
With the NAMA initiative resting with the public sec-
tor, it is logical that the public sector should go first in 
order to inspire private-sector investment. Identifying 
the possible options for redirecting  funds or sources of 
cross-subsidization is an exercise in itself. The UNFC-
CC NAMA guidebook suggests using the Climate Pub-
lic Expenditure and Institutional Review (CPEIR) devel-
oped in 2012 by UNDP and the Overseas Development 
Institute (ODI) to assist in budget analysis relevant to 
public climate expenditure.11 
 
Any freed-up cash flow or investment capital from the 
national budget may be used to leverage international 
public (donor) finance. This does not mean that the two 
sources of public funding, national and donor, should 
be deployed in the same manner. The two should be 
deployed where their special characteristics are most 
valuable. For instance, international donor funding has 
distinct advantages for risk cover, particularly if foreign 
private investment is also being sought. NAMA host 
11 UNDP/ODI (August 2012).
Leveraging Finance  
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country strength, on the other hand, lies in the govern-
ment's regulatory power and the power to rearrange 
the national budget in support of specific purposes. 
Structuring the available finance from these two sourc-
es may create investment conditions and options that 
are attractive for the local private sector, possibly even 
sufficiently attractive for the foreign private investor, who 
generally faces higher investment risks than his local 
competitor.
Thus there is a 'right order of leveraging' (see Figure 6) 
(S.E. Lütken 2014). As the national private sector has 
limited leveraging power over the foreign public donor, 
the national public sector should start its leveraging effort 
by presenting its policy ideas to international donors be-
fore it starts deploying its national financing capacity with 
the aim of securing private-sector initiative. 
The financing value chain
Financial 'engineering' is fundamentally about applying 
more than one type of financing with the aim of bringing 
about a full financial package. As illustrated, the toolbox 
is already diverse and relates to four targets: the asset, 
the finance, the cash flow and the risk. If the point of 
departure is to put in place frameworks that leverage 
the private-sector investor and his banking partners' 
investment appetite, the banks may thus be satisfied by 
four types of instruments (reference is made to Table 2):
1. Support of the asset (GEF incremental costs), 
2. Support of the finance (Mixed credit), 
3. Support of the cash flow, or
4. Reduction of the risk (Export credit)
Supporting the asset refers to the approach represent-
ed by GEF, which ultimately lessens the burden of debt 
service because the debt is smaller. Supporting the fi-
nance is a model used by development agencies either 
through 'mixed credits' or soft loans, or through simple 
concessional loans offered by, for example, IDA (the 
International Development Agency) as part of the World 
Bank. Support of the finance may also materialize as 
the provision of access to market-based financing on 
terms that are otherwise reserved for other purposes 
or clients. Support of the cash flow, as already estab-
lished, in the absence of international support options 
normally has to originate in NAMA host-country national 
budgetary allocations. The reduction of risk normal-
ly succeeds through insurance companies or export 
credit agencies.
The financing value chain is illustrated in Figure 7, 
distributed into the four categories – support for the 
asset, support for the financing, support for the cash 
flow and guarantees. Provision of guarantees reduces 
the cost of financing, concessional loans reduce the 
cost of operating the asset, enhancing the cash flows 
improves the debt service capacity, and a grant for the 
asset naturally reduces the cost of implementation. 
At the same time, the relationship between the four 
possible interventions is thus also indicative of the cost 
of the instrument. The further up the hierarchy, the 
more leveraging is achieved downstream. Thus, when 
putting together instruments in a financial 'package' for 
a NAMA, the larger the share of instruments to the left 
in Figure 7, the higher the potential for leveraging. 
Figure 6. The right order of leveraging  
National public
International public
National private
International private
Source: S. E. Lütken 2014
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Figure 7. The financing Value chain  
For ease of implementation, support of an already 
established support system is to be preferred over the 
creation of new ones. For instance, supporting the 
current export credit system's guarantees is likely to 
have far-reaching effects instead of establishing a new 
guarantee instrument. The reason is at least two-fold: 
1) as the system already exists, it can be deployed 
immediately; and 2) it already possesses the experi-
ence and expertise to design guarantees that precisely 
match the demand. The same principles apply to other 
sorts of financing, for example, the equity funds already 
mentioned. There is no shortage of investment capital, 
and new investment funds will only be redundant as 
long as investment frameworks remain unchanged. 
Should such new funds assume a riskier investment 
profile, they will find themselves alone in the market 
with no co-investors. A Green Climate Fund as a high-
risk investor is therefore not a way forward. Instead Mi-
chaelowa and Hoch (2013)12 have suggested the Green 
Climate Fund as an instrument to fill the gap in cash 
flow support, which would be much more visionary.
12 For further discussion of the Green Climate Fund’s possible role in relation 
to feed-in tariffs, see Michaelowa and Hoch, Design options for the Green 
Climate Fund to support renewable energy feed-in tariffs in developing 
countries, World Future Council, September 2013.
Box 1: The Leveraging Capacity of Fossil 
Fuel Subsidies 
Removal of subsidies to fossil fuel is one of the most 
obvious sources of finance for other climate friendly 
investments. The G-20 countries agreed in Septem-
ber 2009 to phase-out inefficient fossil-fuel subsidies 
over the medium term. It amounts to US$312 billion 
worldwide and 95% of current growth in oil demand 
is coming from countries where the oil price is sub-
ject to subsidies (IEA World Energy Outlook 2010). 
The IEA estimates that removing fossil-fuel con-
sumption subsidies would reduce global carbon-di-
oxide emissions by 1.5 to 2 billion tons by 2020.
While the fuel subsidies seems to indicate an over-
whelming capacity in NAMA countries to provide 
cash flow support it may just as well indicate a lack 
of imagination as to how such cash flows could be 
partly redeployed without causing public uprising. 
Table 3 presented a number of deployment options 
in terms of financial regulatory instruments available 
to the public regulator. Commonly, the relationship 
between required feed-in tariff and land based wind 
energy investment costs is between 1:15 and 1:20 
on an annual basis, but obviously finance depends 
on many other parameters. Therefore, the resulting 
500 GW of wind energy (about 10 times the cur-
rent annual global wind capacity addition) that could 
be supported by the current fuel subsidies is only a 
theoretical number, but it does indicate a sizeable 
potential in a redirection of fossil fuel subsidies. 
Guarantees Support of the
finance
Support of the
service
Support of the
asset
reinsurance guarantee loan subsidy grant
concessional loan
tax holidays taxholidays
Support cascading down through a financing value chain and some relevant instruments at each level
Source: S. E. Lütken 2014
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Separating the instrument from its supplier may there-
fore not always be possible or even desirable. Institu-
tions have their strengths and weaknesses, for instance 
the traditional shortcoming of bilateral assistance in 
terms of provision of cash flow (which is the reason for 
Michaelowa and Hoch's proposal). In current settings, 
however, bilateral donors have particular strengths for 
the provision of guarantees. This could take the form of 
a simple control panel like Figure 8, where the two pub-
lic-sector partners influence risk and return on invest-
ments through the instruments they put in place, with 
the international public sector focusing on the reduc-
tion of risk (which is in part a result of the international 
investors' evaluation of the national regulator), while the 
national public sector focuses on the establishment of 
sufficient cash flow to make private-sector investments 
come together. 
   
This division of labour is mainly a result of the current 
absence of grant-based cash flows ('returns' in Figure 
8), probably due to their incompatibility with the way 
in which donor funding is allocated. Therefore, the na-
tional budget would have to entertain a feed-in tariff on 
its own. A feed-in tariff could, for instance, be funded 
through a reduction in national fossil-fuel subsidies 
(rearranging the national budget). 
National Climate Funds
Some countries are finding ways in which domestic 
funding originating from savings or revenues in one 
activity (e.g. the reduction of subsidies) can be acti-
vated for funding any emissions reductions activities, 
regardless of sector affiliation. Mexico has established 
a NAMA fund that can accrue such amounts and at the 
same time serve as a national coordinator for NAMA 
financing, including international funding. Such struc-
tures require a general national priority for NAMA devel-
opment and awareness of the fact that without activat-
ing the possible national funding sources the chances 
of attracting any other source of funding – private or 
public – are limited.
The challenge for the national climate funds is that, 
while they may be practical for concentrating funds 
from different sources, they may not be practical for de-
ploying the financing in the form of specially designed 
instruments for particular purposes. Instead of blending 
different kinds of financial instruments, all contributions 
might instead be homogenized into grants, which is 
ultimately the opposite of blending. They may in effect 
work counter to the financing value chain and forgo 
valuable leveraging options. Before establishing such 
national funds, it should therefore be carefully con-
sidered whether they serve a purpose in terms of the 
deployment of financial resources, or whether they 
ultimately become parallel structures with limited expe-
rience alongside existing institutions with more experi-
ence and dedicated instruments.
 
They might nonetheless be efficient as revolving funds, 
although this will not make them more efficient in terms 
of leveraging. A common investment barrier is high 
up-front costs, or more precisely the price of the asset. 
Access to patient capital is one of the most efficient 
responses in cases where the asset is profitable over 
time, like most energy-efficiency investments. Funds 
that address this financing shortfall can be established 
as revolving funds that return the longer term profits 
Figure 8. Risk/return control panel  
Risk Return
International National
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into new investments. Revolving funds are obviously 
not exempt from the logic of the financing value chain, 
but as outlays return to the investment fund in full, they 
are self-sustaining and require no cash flow support. 
This is the fundamental principle underlying Energy 
Service Companies (ESCOs), which, for instance, take 
over the energy supply for an energy-intensive industrial 
facility, invest their capital in efficient equipment and 
operate the energy supply over a few years to recover 
that investment through savings, after which they return 
the more efficient energy-supply system to the host of 
the installation. Similar models are used in the housing 
sector and could equally be used in public transport, 
for instance, for electric buses.  
In cases where an asset cannot produce the service 
at the market price due to high operating costs or 
high capital costs, the investment has to be supported 
throughout its financial lifetime by one of the instru-
ments suggested, mainly guarantees and/or favourable 
loan arrangements or, as a last resort, by a GEF-like 
grant for the capital costs. If the lack of competitiveness 
is caused by subsidies for competing technologies, the 
immediate answer would be a revision of the subsidy 
policy. Unrevised subsidies may be increasingly difficult 
to uphold in parallel to requests for (grant) funding of 
competing alternatives. Also ESCOs become increas-
ingly relevant with reduced subsidies.
Layered, phased and parallel NAMAs 
Engineering the financial model for a NAMA need not 
be an isolated effort for a single policy or programme. 
For instance, a phasing-out programme for inefficient 
coal-fired power plants could be accompanied by a 
nationwide energy efficiency programme or a house-
hold solar water heating programme that avoids the 
need to invest in replacement capacity. Mauritius has 
successfully run such a programme for years, replacing 
the need to invest in coal-based electricity generation. 
Saved operational costs for power generation from one 
NAMA could be directed towards a grant programme 
for CFLs or solar water heaters in another NAMA. A 
third NAMA could introduce the compulsory exchange 
of inefficient equipment such as pumps if savings in the 
second NAMA are not sufficient to reach the objective 
of the first NAMA.
   
A phased NAMA could introduce a smaller regional 
programme for rural solar PV lighting based on a 
national grant to demonstrate its benefits in emissions 
reductions (savings on generator fuel) and social as-
pects (reach to households without generators), while 
preparing a national programme as Phase 2 for the 
possible intervention of emissions traders in the CDM 
or the voluntary carbon market. Alternatively it might 
apply to bilateral donors with micro-credit schemes or 
interests in providing grants on the basis of emissions 
reductions, possibly accompanied by requirements 
for technology purchases (currently seen in Japanese 
interventions).
 
A layered NAMA could introduce two or more avenues 
of emissions reductions in the same industry. For 
instance, imposing waste heat recovery systems in 
the cement industry as step 1, e.g. through the use of 
ESCOs, introducing clinker replacements through regu-
lation as step 2, and finally imposing a gradual shift to-
wards renewable fuels in the production (e.g. biomass 
or sludge) as step 3 would constitute layers. As waste 
heat recovery is normally profitable, it may support the 
net costs incurred in steps 2 and 3. 
 
Such mutually supporting NAMAs may be efficient 
emissions reduction responses, although the cross-
subsidization that they might represent complicates the 
financial engineering and puts the entire model at risk. 
The ideal situation is therefore if such mutually support-
ing NAMAs can serve both as stand-alone activities 
and as possible elements in a grander scheme. 
Putting the pieces together
The main principle from a financing and leveraging 
point of view is that the leveraging instruments listed 
in Table 3 are sought to be capitalized first. Those are 
the options for the deployment of public-sector funds. 
The structuring of these, employing different sources of 
public funding, is what will ultimately determine the size 
of the private sector’s involvement. Sufficient funding 
should be secured before launch to avoid the risk of 
having to change halfway. Discontinuity and smallness 
of scale are significant deterrents to private-sector 
involvement.
The advantage of starting with private-sector conditions 
is that the gaps in the financing models are identified 
early on, including particularly the gaps in risk cover, 
as identified by CPI. This may help substantiate the 
requirements for donor involvement. As mentioned 
above, donor governments are particularly well-suited 
for the provision of political guarantees for the involve-
ment of the private sector. 
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Although donor countries' export credit agencies are 
so far only relevant to FDI – the last source of finance 
according to the hierarchy established in Figure 6 – the 
principle also applies in national contexts in which invest-
ment guarantees are notoriously difficult to obtain, often 
with the requirement that an amount in cash similar to 
the size of the guarantee be deposited in a bank. Such 
a guarantee is obviously worthless. Supporting national 
guarantee structures could release local private-sector 
investments and at the same time put national inves-
tors on an equal footing with foreign investors in joint 
projects. In such joint projects other hybrid institutions 
provide another efficient instrument in the form of equity. 
Equity participation by a hybrid financing institution 
stretches the reach of the private-sector investments 
and is an efficient supplement to the guarantees. It also 
has the nature of a revolving fund in that it withdraws 
(divests) invested capital once the project is a going 
venture and deploys it in new ventures.
 
Figure 9 puts the elements together in an 'expanded 
securitization model', the structure of which is inherited 
from project finance and adapted to the NAMA. It in-
cludes the developed country sources of finance to the 
left and the NAMA host government to the right, play-
ing the role both as part-financier and part-financing 
channel for international funding. In the middle of the 
figure is an investment resulting from the NAMA under-
taken by a private investor on the basis of instruments 
established and financed through different institutions. 
This model includes the Green Climate Fund in different 
roles, including that of providing guarantees and/or 
support for cash flows through the NAMA host govern-
ment, but it also includes taxation-based cash flows 
in the NAMA host country directed towards the con-
sumers that benefit from the services provided by the 
private investor. The SPV, or Special Purpose Vehicle, 
in the centre of the figure is the entity around which the 
financial engineering is concentrated, as was the case 
in the heyday of the BOT model and as continues to be 
the case for today's PPPs. Loans and guarantees sup-
port the basic equity investment undertaken by private 
investors, possibly in partnership with hybrid financial 
institutions that co-invest on the basis of market-based 
investment criteria, that is, risk/return ratios at par with 
market requirements.
 
Now the challenge is how to get to this point.
Figure 9. Expanded securitization model
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The aggregator
The UNFCCC Secretariat has established a NAMA 
Registry to which countries can submit their unilateral 
NAMAs for recognition or proposals for supported 
NAMAs with the aim of attracting donor funding. This 
is a platform through which requests for financing 
can already be channelled. The disadvantage of this 
approach is that proposals may not reflect the priori-
ties of any donor, nor does the approach allow for any 
financial engineering with engagement from a group 
of donors in different roles and with different financial 
instruments. It requires financiers themselves to coor-
dinate their involvement in a particular NAMA, unless 
any of them want to be the sole financier. If not, this 
constitutes a kind of random syndication model, which 
is unlikely to bring about an efficient financial model for 
any NAMA.
 
Generating insights into different financing models and 
instruments is not a skill commonly existing within the 
line ministries of NAMA host countries, which are the 
most likely initiator or developer of NAMA proposals. 
Therefore, identifying a central financial institution that 
can provide advice on the structuring of the finance 
for a particular NAMA is essential. Such an institution 
may play the role of financial “aggregator” based on 
its understanding of the functions of various financial 
instruments.
 
An aggregator will act as a neutral financial adviser or 
“financial engineer”, but may have a potential inter-
est in eventually becoming involved financially in the 
implementation of the NAMA. Part of this assistance 
may be delivered through donor-funded 'readiness' 
programmes, but even these are at risk of being 
disconnected from the financial sector because that is 
not their traditional affiliation. The most obvious candi-
dates for the aggregator role are the 'hybrid' financiers, 
who are most likely to be familiar with the entire range 
of public- and private-sector instruments due to their 
foundation as publicly supported financial institutions 
with a private-sector operational mandate.
  
In traditional assistance, the aggregator function is 
mainly established on the supply side at donor coor-
dination meetings when programmes are being imple-
mented, more than when the programmes are being 
designed. The perspectives for the aggregator, how-
ever, lie in actively concerting the financial engineering 
effort before implementation. The aggregator would 
need to devise a strategy for leveraging finance for a 
number of instruments from the most relevant sources 
among national and international financiers divided 
among a multitude of institutions. The aggregators' role 
is a significant expansion of the one filled by syndica-
tors during the 1990s financial engineering of private 
infrastructure. The syndicator organized several financ-
ing sources in order to bring financial closure to a single 
project structure. The aggregator must, in addition, 
help structure the demands for financial instruments, 
prospectively deployed through public–public partner-
ships, which can be presented to the donor communi-
ty, possibly including the Green Climate Fund. This is a 
function that has little, if any, experience in the financial 
community.
The idea of formalized aggregators to devise financing 
models for NAMAs, including proposals for financing 
instruments, is presented by S.E. Lütken (2014). This 
is not straightforward to implement because it inter-
feres with the way in which development assistance 
is normally deployed. The NAMA Facility has already 
indicated that is it willing to provide instruments as 
necessary, but that is so far the only example, which 
does not exactly fill the aggregator's role; rather, it 
takes form of a one-stop shop or a 'financial supermar-
ket' that delivers whatever is required. The challenge 
is to know exactly what is required, which is where the 
aggregator's expertise and independent advice comes 
in. So far, NAMA financing schemes do not provide 
new models of financing. Instead, they produce new 
selection criteria for the provision of traditional (and 
already existing) financing. They require applicants to 
describe their ideas and budget for them before any 
financing model has been considered that will facilitate 
such budgeting. Applicants, therefore, at best, may 
be able to calculate basic 'incremental costs' without 
any sophistication, which inevitably leads them into the 
least efficient NAMA financing model. 
Lütken suggests that 'aggregating' the finance and 
devoting different sources to differing purposes should 
be done on a case-by-case basis by shifting teams of 
financial engineers (for lack of a better title). Whatever the 
composition of these teams – ad-hoc groups of repre-
sentatives from different financing institutions assisted by 
financial engineers, or a formalized aggregating company 
or institution with the task of putting together the best 
possible financing structure for a given NAMA – they 
would have to follow a strategy that brings as much 
existing investment capital as possible into the service of 
the climate change mitigation objective.
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NAMAs have brought asset finance back into the 
centre of the climate change agenda, and NAMA 
host countries are looking for ways to attract 'climate 
finance' from yet undefined sources. The past ten 
years of experience with CDM, however, has been that 
by and large the asset finance has originated with the 
developing countries themselves. The NAMA idea is 
unlikely to change this pattern, but the renewed focus 
on asset finance should help bring some of the central 
investment parameters related to risk avoidance into fo-
cus together with the obvious shortage of instruments 
that can enhance long-term cash flows for low emis-
sion alternatives. In terms of risk mitigation – particularly 
regulatory and policy risks – it is exactly those that 
governments and donors acting jointly are best suited 
to addressing. 
However, there is an obvious 'NAMA financing gap'. 
Current models for applying development and climate 
assistance are either:
1.  long-term asset financing, including investment 
guarantees, or
2.  short-term operational budgets (short grant pro-
grammes),
whereas long-term financing models or platforms for 
enhanced cash flows do not exist among international 
financial institutions. At the same time, however, it is 
exactly dependable long-term cash flows that enable 
the transformational changes that NAMAs ultimate-
ly have to deliver in order to attract the international 
financier. When looking for innovation in climate and 
NAMA finance, this should mainly focus on models for 
establishing such long-term cash flows and on guaran-
tee models that ensure the market's trust in such cash 
flows. In addition, development of instruments such as 
green bonds, expanded guarantees and mixed green 
credits may help reduce cash flow demand.
NAMA host countries need to provide investment cli-
mates that are stable and long term. This requires long 
term financing, which is incompatible with traditional 
ways of providing bilateral assistance. Countries need 
models that can convert short term finance into long 
term investment regimes. Countries need instruments 
that link public and private finance that are grossly 
uncoordinated. And counties need to realize that the 
prime audience for their investment regimes is their own 
local private sector. Although this sounds as if donors 
are marginal to NAMA development, they are essen-
tial in catalytic roles, to bridge financial gaps, and not 
least to lead the way in their own reduction efforts. But 
NAMAs, to be sustainable, and thus transformational, 
must to the largest possible extent rely on national 
resources in the long term. The NAMA is a platform and 
a concept to bring matured investors and financing, 
– assisted by developed countries, and possibly with 
institutions in aggregator roles – into low-carbon devel-
opment in NAMA host countries. Both parties, howev-
er, must realize their roles and be willing to play them 
conscientiously. If they succeed in that, the financial 
engineering of NAMAs will be a central factor in meet-
ing the 2 degree challenge. 
Conclusion
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